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CRIMINAL LAW
Richard A. Williamson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Effective January 1, 1985, the Court of Appeals of Virginia was
established.' The new intermediate appellate court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from any final judgment of conviction in a circuit court for a traffic violation or a crime, except
where a sentence of death is imposed.2 The operation of the court
of appeals is likely to have a twofold effect on the criminal justice
system. First, it should reduce the current backlog of cases in the
supreme court; second, it should produce an increase in the number of reported criminal decisions, thereby facilitating an understanding of criminal law and procedure. For the first time, therefore, a review of criminal law developments in the commonwealth
must include the work of an additional court.
Another significant recent development in criminal law is the
continuing attention the legislature has given to laws dealing with
the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. While it is
unlikely that the last chapter on this problem has been written,
the 1986 session of the General Assembly produced another major
revision in the manner in which "drunk driving" cases will be
handled.
Finally, during the past few years both the General Assembly
and the supreme court have considered the problems associated
with allegations of interspousal rape. The supreme court, applying
Virginia's general rape statute, recently decided two cases involving claims of marital rape. As a result of these decisions, Virginia
joined other states in authorizing the prosecution of sexual offenses
committed by one spouse against the other. In the 1986 session of
the General Assembly, the legislature completely rewrote the law
with respect to interspousal sexual offenses and created not only
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William

and Mary; B.B.A., 1965, Ohio University; J.D., 1968, Ohio State University.
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1. 1983 Va. Acts 519-23.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.05:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
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separate statutory offenses, but also separate procedural and sentencing schemes for such offenses.
The discussion that follows will review and explain the major
substantive criminal law developments from 1984 to 1986, including some of the major statutory revisions adopted during the 1985
and 1986 sessions of the General Assembly.

II.
A.

HOMICIDE

Capital Murder

The Virginia Supreme Court continues to hear and resolve a significant number of death penalty cases.3 In Tuggle v. Commonwealth,4 a case remanded by the United States Supreme Court 5 for
reconsideration "in light of' the decision in Ake v. Oklahoma,' the
Virginia Supreme Court upheld a death sentence even though it
concluded that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for an independent psychiatrist to rebut the psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness proffered bv the commonwealth at
the sentencing phase of the trial. The court held that when, as in
this case, the jury finds that the commonwealth has proved both
the "dangerousness" and the "vileness" predicates for the imposition of the death penalty and one of the predicates subsequently is
invalidated on appeal, the remaining predicate is sufficient to support the verdict and no further proceeding is required. 7
As previously noted, under the Virginia capital murder statute,
the trier of fact is authorized to impose the death penalty upon
finding either or both of two "aggravating circumstances." The
3. See, e.g., Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 337 S.E.2d 715 (1985); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838 (1985); Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 331
S.E.2d 407 (1985); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 331 S.E.2d 422 (1985); Poyner v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815 (1985); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 229 Va.
303, 329 S.E.2d 807 (1985).
4. 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838 (1985).
5. Tuggle v. Virginia, 105 S. Ct. 2315 (1985).
6. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). Ake held that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the
state must provide the defendant access to psychiatric assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise afford his own psychiatrist. Id. at 1097. Ake also held that in a capital
case, where the state relies on psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness,
the state must provide an indigent defendant with access to a defense psychiatrist. Id. at
1099.
7. Tuggle, 230 Va. at 110, 334 S.E.2d at 845 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983)).
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trier of fact must find that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society" (the so-called "future dangerousness" predicate), or "that his conduct in committing the offense
for which he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind
or an aggravated battery to the victim" (the so-called "vileness"
predicate).'
The statute governing proof of future dangerousness is facially
ambiguous. The Virginia Code (the "Code") provides that the trier
of fact may impose a sentence of death upon finding that the defendant poses a continuing threat to society after considering his
prior "criminal record of convictions," 9 and yet the Code also authorizes the commonwealth to introduce "evidence of the prior history of the defendant" to establish future dangerousness. 10 The supreme court previously rejected a "vagueness" challenge to this
statute and held that in determining the probability of a defendant's future criminal conduct it "is essential.

. .

that the jury have

before it all possible relevant information about the individual.""
Thus, the commonwealth may introduce not only the defendant's
record of convictions, but also testimonial evidence relating to the
commission of those crimes.1 2 The court also has allowed the introduction of evidence of other criminal acts for which the defendant
was not convicted.'The "aggravated battery" element of the "vileness" predicate
continues to cause problems. The supreme court has stated that to
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Repl. Vol. 1983). The jury, of course, must still recommend
the imposition of the death penalty. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 19.2-264.4 (C).
11. LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 594, 304 S.E.2d 644, 660 (1983) (emphasis
in original), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275-76
(1976)).
12. See, e.g., Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 43-44, 307 S.E.2d 864, 870-71 (1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 298, 302 S.E.2d
520, 526, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 520 (1983); Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 147-48,
295 S.E.2d 643, 653-54 (1982); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 275-77, 257 S.E.2d
808, 819 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
13. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 488, 331 S.E.2d 422, 436 (1985) (admission of
evidence of another killing by the defendant for which he had yet to be tried); Poyner, 229
Va. at 418, 329 S.E.2d at 827 (admission of a confession in which the defendant admitted
the killing of three other women for which he had yet to be tried); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 147, 314 S.E.2d 371, 385, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984) (admission of
testimony that the defendant had killed another individual).
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support a finding under the aggravated battery theory, the commonwealth must prove that the battery was "qualitatively and
quantitatively. . more culpable than the minimum necessary to
accomplish an act of murder."14 While an aggravated battery is not
established by evidence that the victim died almost instantaneously from a single gunshot wound,' 5 proof of the infliction of multiple wounds may meet the test for an aggravated battery if death
was not instantaneous and the shots were separated by a lapse of
time. 6 It is immaterial whether the victim remained conscious
during the course of several asaults.17 Both the aggravated battery
and "torture" elements of the vileness predicate ordinarily connote
conduct preceding the death of the victim.' s
The third element of the vileness predicate, depravity of mind,
can exist independently of the other two.' 9 Conduct such as "mutilation, gross disfigurement or sexual assault committed upon a
corpse or an unconscious body evinces 'depravity of mind.' ",20
Hence, an attempt to incinerate a corpse is sufficient to support a
finding of depravity of mind.2 '
A trial court is not constitutionally required to define for the
jury the statutory requirements for the imposition of the death
penalty. 2 The definitions of the various predicates are appropriate
as standards for appellate review 23 and are not necessarily required
as part of the instructions to the jury, although the trial court does
possess the authority to define the legal terminology in the statute
for the jury.24
14. Wise, 230 Va. at 335, 337 S.E.2d at 723; Boggs, 229 Va. at 521, 331 S.E.2d at 421;
Watkins, 229 Va. at 489, 331 S.E.2d at 437; Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248
S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
15. Watkins, 229 Va. at 489, 331 S.E.2d at 437; Peterson, 225 Va. at 296, 302 S.E.2d at
525.
16. Boggs, 229 Va. at 521, 331 S.E.2d at 421; Watkins, 229 Va. at 489-90, 331 S.E.2d at
437.
17. Boggs, 229 Va. at 521, 331 S.E.2d at 421; Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 44748, 323 S.E.2d 554, 565 (1984).
18. Jones, 228 Va. at 448, 323 S.E.2d at 565.
19. Id.; see also Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 442, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282 (1983),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
20. Jones, 228 Va. at 448, 323 S.E.2d at 565.
21. See id.
22. Tuggle, 228 Va. at 515, 323 S.E.2d at 553; Jones, 228 Va. at 446, 323 S.E.2d at 564;
Bunch, 225 Va. at 447, 304 S.E.2d at 285; Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 254, 257
S.E.2d 797, 805 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980).
23. Jones, 228 Va. at 446, 323 S.E.2d at 564.
24. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert. denied,
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Although the United States Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue, the jury selection process in capital murder trials
remains a source of controversy. The problem of selecting a "death
qualified" jury has existed since the 1968 decision in Witherspoon
v. Illinois.25 The Witherspoon rule, as modified by more recent decisions, provides that a prospective juror may be excluded "for
cause" because of his or her views on capital punishment, if "those
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath." 26 Defense objections to the exclusion of jurors "for cause"
because of their opposition to the death penalty have been
27
numerous.

More recently, defendants have challenged "death qualified" juries on the ground that such juries violate their right to a jury representing a fair cross section of the community. 2 Defendants have
argued that this violation constitutes a denial of their right to an
impartial jury because such "death qualified" juries are more
"guilt prone. '2 9 The United States Supreme Court recently rejected these contentions."
The Virginia Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of a statute which authorizes the use of a new jury for resentencing in the event a death sentence (but not a guilty verdict) is
set aside on appeal. 31 The court also held that a jury verdict in a
capital murder trial fixing punishment at life imprisonment must
441 U.S. 967 (1979).
25. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court held that it is permissible to
exclude jurors "for cause" if they make it unmistakably clear that they will automatically
vote against the death sentence regardless of the evidence and circumstances, or that their
views on the death penalty will prevent them from making an "impartial decision" on the
question of guilt. Id. at 522 n.21.
26. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844
(1985).
27. See, e.g., Coppola, 220 Va. at 248-50, 257 S.E.2d at 801-02; Smith, 219 Va. at 464, 248
S.E.2d at 141.
28. LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 576, 304 S.E.2d at 650; Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683,
690-91, 251 S.E.2d 202, 207, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979).
29. Le Vasseur, 225 Va. at 576, 304 S.E.2d at 650.
30. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). Lockhart held that a "death qualified"
jury does not violate the fair cross section requirement nor does it violate the defendant's
right to an impartial jury even assuming, arguendo, that scientific studies demonstrate that
"death qualification" in fact produces juries somewhat more conviction prone than "nondeath qualified" juries.
31. Evans v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 468, 474-77, 323 S.E.2d 114, 118-20 (1984); see VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
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be by unanimous vote even though the statutory form of jury verdict does not so expressly provide.32 Finally, the supreme court rejected a challenge that the statutory verdict form unconstitutionally lists aggravating factors without listing mitigating factors and
fails to state a standard of proof for evidence in mitigation.3 The
United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional mandate
that a jury's discretion be "guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty"3 4 is not violated by this form of jury
verdict.
In the 1985 session of the General Assembly, the legislature
added another form of capital murder to the list of capital
offenses:
[t]he willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a child under
the age of twleve years in the commission of abduction as defined in
§ 18.2-48 when such abduction was committed with the intent to
extort money or a pecuniary benefit, or with the intent to defile the
victim of such abduction. 5
In Harward -v. Commonwealth,6 the supreme court held that
Virginia Code section 18.2-31(e), murder during the commission of
rape, only proscribes the murder of a rape victim and cannot be
extended to include the murder of another; accordingly, the court"
reversed a conviction for capital murder where the defendant
3
killed the husband of the rape victim prior to the sexual assault. 7
32. Evans, 228 Va. at 480-81, 323 S.E.2d at 121 (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(D)
(Repl. Vol. 1983)). Subsection (D)(1) requires the jury to "unanimously fix [the defendant's]
punishment at death" while subsection (D)(2) merely provides that the jury may "fix [the
defendant's] punishment at imprisonment for life." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(D)(1)-(2)
(Repl. Vol. 1983).
33. Watkins, 229 Va. at 490-91, 331 S.E.2d at 438. The court concluded that the statutory
form of verdict actually benefits the accused since the aggravating factors are expressly limited while the mitigating factors are not so confined. Id. at 491, 331 S.E.2d at 438.
34. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(h) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
36. 229 Va. 363, 330 S.E.2d 89 (1985).
37. Id. at 366-67, 330 S.E.2d at 91. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(e) (Cum. Supp. 1986) provides that the "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a person during the commission of, or subsequent to, rape" shall constitute capital murder (emphasis added). The court
found it significant that the provision refers to the killing of "a person" while other capital
murder offenses, such as murder in the commission of robbery, refer to the killing of "any
person." Harward,229 Va. at 366, 330 S.E.2d at 91. The court also found it significant that
the capital murder-rape provision refers to a killing "during the commission of or subsequent to" rape rather than a killing "in the commission" of the felony. Id. (emphasis
added).
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In Watkins v. Commonwealth,38 the defendant argued that he
could not be convicted of murder in the commission of robbery
because he did not actually take the property that was alleged to
have been stolen. The supreme court disagreed and held that the
commonwealth "need only prove that the defendant actually committed the murder and was an accomplice in the robbery." 9
B.

Second-Degree Murder

Despite increasing public awareness of the dangers associated
with drug use and drunk driving, serious criminal prosecutions remain uncommon in such cases even when death results. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, recently sustained a second-degree
murder conviction of an individual who provided cocaine to a willing user who ingested the drug and died as a result. 40 In another
case, however, the supreme court held that driving under the influence of alcohol, standing alone and without more, no matter how
appalling such conduct may be, is insufficient to support a conviction for second-degree murder.4
In Heacock v. Commonwealth,4 2 the defendant provided cocaine
for a "drug party. ' ' 43 One of the participants died of "acute intravenous cocainism. 4 4 The evidence at trial did not establish how
the fatal injection was accomplished, but there was testimony that
the defendant was present when another participant injected the
substance and that he participated in the preparation of the substance for its intravenous administration.4 5 The defendant was
charged with and convicted of second-degree felony-murder-"[t]he killing of one accidentally, contrary to the intention of
the parties, while in the process of some felonious act other than
[capital murder and specified other felonies]. '46 The underlying
felony used to support the felony-murder charge was the distribu38. 229 Va. 469, 331 S.E.2d 422 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1503 (1986).
39. Id. at 485-86, 331 S.E.2d at 435; see also Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 573,
273 S.E.2d 57, 63 (1980).
40. Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984).
41. Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 322 S.E.2d 216 (1984).
42. 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984).
43. Id. at 401, 323 S.E.2d at 93.
44. Id. at 402, 323 S.E.2d at 93.
45. Id. at 401-02, 323 S.E.2d at 92-93.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-33 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
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tion of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance.4"
The defendant raised several objections to the application of the
second-degree felony-murder statute in these circumstances: first,
there was no evidence that he administered the fatal injection; second, death was not a "foreseeable consequence" of the criminal
conduct alleged in the indictment; third, the felony-murder rule
does not apply "unless the underlying felony is shown to be the
proximate cause of death;" and finally, the felony-murder rule is
inapplicable since the decedent "was a co-felon in the sense that
she was present at a 'drug party.' ))48
The court rejected all contentions. First, the court stated that it
was immaterial whether the defendant actually injected the fatal
dosage. 49 The evidence established that the defendant participated

in the preparation of the drug for intravenous injection; as such, he
was a principal in the second degree, equally culpable as if a principal in the first degree. ° Second, the court held that nothing in
the second-degree felony-murder statute limits its application to
felonies "not foreseeably dangerous." 51 The court went on to hold,
however, that even if the statute were so confined, the unlawful
distribution of cocaine and its injection constitute conduct which
the defendant knew or should have known was "inherently dangerous to human life."'52 Third, the court held that the "cause and

effect" between the distribution of the cocaine and the decedent's
death from its intravenous injection "were proximately interrelated. '5' Finally, the court held that while a "criminal participant
in a felony may not be convicted of the felony-murder of a co-felon
killed by the victim of the initial felony," such was not the case
here because the decedent was not a co-felon killed by the victim
of the drug distribution felony but was, instead, the "victim" of
47. Heacock, 228 Va. at 403, 323 S.E.2d at 93.
48. Id. at 405, 323 S.E.2d at 95.
49. Id. at 403, 323 S.E.2d at 94.
50. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (Repl. Vol. 1982) ("every principal in the second
degree ... may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in
the first degree"). A principal in the second degree is a person present, actually or constructively assisting in the commission of the crime. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va.
370, 372, 157 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967).
51. Heacock, 228 Va. at 404, 323 S.E.2d at 94.
52. Id. at 403-04, 323 S.E.2d at 94; see supra text accompanying note 47. The court noted
that cocaine is classified as a "Schedule II controlled substance" under the Virginia Code
because it "has high potential for abuse" which "may lead to severe psychic or physical
dependence." Heacock, 228 Va. at 404, 323 S.E.2d at 94.
53. Heacock, 228 Va. at 404-05, 323 S.E.2d at 94.
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that crime.54

The result in the Heacock case is consistent with the modern
view of felony-murder. While some jurisdictions limit the application of felony-murder statutes to felonies that are "inherently dangerous,' 55 there is ample support for the position that the sale of

certain drugs is a "dangerous felony," so that when the purchaser
dies from an overdose, the seller who furnished the drug is guilty
of felony-murder.56 The Heacock decision, however, was not a simple seller-purchaser case; instead, the defendant, in addition to
providing the drug, was present and apparently participated in its
preparation for intravenous injection. It is thus unclear whether
the reasoning and rationale of the decision would extend to cover a
situation where the defendant was the mere provider of the drug
and not present when the drug was consumed. The court's analysis
in Heacock is confusing because, at one point, the court described
the defendant as a principal in the second degree to the act of the
injection of the fatal dose, suggesting that it was this conduct
rather than the distribution of the drug which supported the conviction. The problem arises from the fact that he was charged with
and convicted of distribution of cocaine. The underlying felonious
act charged was not the injection of the fatal dosage.
In Essex v. Commonwealth,57 the supreme court held that when
a killing results from negligence, however gross or culpable, and is
contrary to the defendant's intention, a second-degree murder conviction cannot be sustained; the fact and degree of intoxication,
54. Id. at 405, 323 S.E.2d at 95. The court distinguished its decision in Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981), which held that a criminal participant in a
felony may not be convicted of the felony-murder of a co-felon killed by the victim of the
initial felony. There are two competing theories of felony-murder. The first, the so-called
"agency" theory, holds that the crime does not extend to a killing that is attributable to the
act of someone other than one of the felons, even though it was "caused" by the felony. The
other, the so-called "proximate cause" theory, holds that the crime extends to include any
death proximately resulting from the felony, including the death of one of the felons. The
Wooden decision clearly rests on the "agency" theory of felony-murder.

55. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574,

-,

414 P.2d 353, 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225,

232 (1966) (holding that only felonies "'inherently dangerous to human life' can support the
application of the felony murder rule").
56. State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984).
57. 228 Va.273, 322 S.E.2d 216 (1984). Essex was convicted of one count of driving under
the influence of alcohol and three counts of second-degree murder arising from an automobile collision. A blood test conducted about two and one-half hours after the accident established Essex's blood-alcohol level at 0.144 percent. Id. at 279, 322 S.E.2d at 219. For a discussion of the driving-under-the-influence aspects of this case, see infra text accompanying

notes 94-97.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:765

standing alone, "neither enhances nor impairs" proof of the required element of malice.58
As the Essex court emphasized, the element of malice is what
distinguishes murder from manslaughter. Under Virginia law, malice can be either express or implied. "Express malice is evidenced
when 'one person kills another with a sedate, deliberate mind, and
formed design'. . . . Implied malice exists when any purposeful,
cruel act is committed by one individual against another without
any, or without great provocation ....
In either case, however,
the wrongful act must be done "wilfully or purposefully;"6 0 that is,
to sustain a conviction requiring proof of malice, "the defendant
must be shown to have wilfully or purposefully, rather than negligently, embarked upon a course of wrongful conduct likely to cause
death or great bodily harm."'"
"5

With this background, the court in Essex held that a defendant's
degree of intoxication, however great, is irrelevant to the determination whether the killing was with malice; the issue, instead, is
whether the act causing death was volitional or inadvertent. 2 In
Essex, the court noted the absence of evidence on the issue
"whether the defendant embarked upon his ill-fated course of conduct wilfully and with a malicious purpose. 6' 3 The implication
from this language is that while it is theoretically possible to convict the drunk driver of second-degree murder, the proof of malice
must come from evidence other than the fact of the defendant's
intoxication and its degree.
58. Essex, 228 Va. at 282, 322 S.E.2d at 221.
59. Id. at 280, 322 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting Pugh v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 663, 668, 292
S.E.2d 339, 341 (1982)) (emphasis added).
60. Essex, 228 Va. at 280-81, 322 S.E.2d at 220.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 282, 322 S.E.2d at 221.
63. Id. at 284, 322 S.E.2d at 222. Justice Poff dissented in part, arguing that there is a
"species of reckless behavior so willful and wanton, so heedless of foreseeable consequences,
and so indifferent to the value of human life that it supplies the element of malice which
distinguishes murder of the second degree from manslaughter." Id. at 288, 322 S.E.2d at 224
(Poff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Poff went on to argue that
"where the evidence is sufficient to show that the driver of a motor vehicle, whether drunk
or sober, is guilty of criminal negligence which is the sole proximate cause of a homicide,
such evidence raises a question of fact whether the offense is manslaughter or murder of the
second degree." Id. at 289, 322 S.E.2d at 225.
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III.

MARITAL RAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES

During the past three years, both the Virginia Supreme Court
and the General Assembly have considered the unique problems
arising from allegations of rape committed by one spouse against
the other. Historically, courts have assumed that "the husband
cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which
she cannot retract." Times change. As one court noted: "In the
years since [the] formulation of [this] rule, attitudes towards the
permanency of marriage have changed .... This rule ... need
not prevail ....

In the 1984 case of Weishaupt v. Commonwealth,6 the supreme
court reviewed the development of both the law of "marital rape"
and the more general subject of the legal standing of women in this
country and in England, and concluded that the clear trend in
both countries was toward an "increasingly recognized role of the
autonomy and independence of women" and a "break with the ancient rules that cast women in a subservient posture.

'67

The court

also concluded that under certain circumstances, a husband could
be convicted of the rape of his wife under Virginia's general rape
statute. The court held that a wife can unilaterally revoke her implied consent to marital sex (and thus open the possibility of a
finding of rape) when: (1) she manifests "her intent to terminate
the marital relationship by living separate and apart from her husband;" (2) she refrains "from voluntary sexual intercourse with her
64. 1

M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN

629 (1736).

65. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, -,
426 A.2d 38, 42 (1981).
66. 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
67. Id. at 402, 315 S.E.2d at 854. The court noted that judicial decisions in four states had
held that, under appropriate circumstances, a husband could be found guilty of raping his
wife. Id. at 401, 315 S.E.2d at 853. The court also considered judicial decisions in Virginia
regarding the "ever-increasing separateness and independence accorded women," id. at 400,
315 S.E.2d at 853, including Stewart v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 887, 252 S.E.2d 329 (1979)
(holding that a husband could be found guilty of grand larceny for stealing his wife's property); Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983)
(declaring the "necessaries" doctrine unconstitutional); and Knox v. Commonwealth, 225
Va. 504, 304 S.E.2d 4 (1983) (holding that a husband could be found guilty of burglarizing
his wife's separately maintained dwelling). Finally, the court recognized that under the Virginia no-fault divorce statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Cum. Supp. 1986), the legislature
implicitly recognized the right of married women to withdraw an implied consent to marital
sex because the statute requires the parties to live "separate and apart" without cohabitation in order to secure the divorce. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 402-03, 315 S.E.2d at 854.
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husband;" and (3) "in light of all the circumstances," conducts herself "in a manner that establishes a de facto end to the marriage. '" The commonwealth, of course, would still have to prove
that the act was accomplished against the will of the wife by force,
9
6

threat or intimidation.

The Weishaupt decision, in which the defendant was found
guilty of rape, was followed the same year by Kizer v. Commonwealth,70 where the supreme court overturned a marital rape conviction. The Kizer opinion noted that, under Weishaupt, the prosecution, in addition to proving the usual elements of rape, "must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the wife unilaterally had revoked her implied consent to marital intercourse," a finding which
"must be demonstrated by a manifest intent 'to terminate the
marital relationship.' "1 Reviewing the facts before it, the court
concluded that the wife had not conducted herself "in a manner
that establish[ed] a de facto end to the marriage. 7' 2 The court

stated that while "the wife subjectively considered the marriage
fractured beyond repair" when the parties separated three weeks
before the assault, "the subjective intent was [not] manifested objectively to the husband, in view of the wife's vacillating conduct,
so that he perceived, or reasonably should have perceived, that the
3
marriage actually was ended.

'7

68. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 855. In Weishaupt, the defendant was found
guilty of the attempted rape of his estranged wife. The parties bad separated eleven months
prior to the attack. Their contact was limited to telephone conversations concerning their
infant child and chance public meetings. The wife had consulted a lawyer about a divorce.
The defendant entered his wife's apartment and began fighting with another man who was
in the apartment. The assault occurred after the other man left the apartment. Id. at 39294, 315 S.E.2d at 848.
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
70. 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984).
71. Id. at 260-61, 321 S.E.2d at 293 (quoting Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at
855).
72. Id. at 261, 321 S.E.2d at 294.
73. 228 Va. at 261-62, 321 S.E.2d at 294. The court described the wife's conduct during
the six month period preceding the assault as "equivocal, ambivalent, and ambiguous." Id.
at 261, 321 S.E.2d at 294. The wife first left the marital abode approximately six months
before the assault, but she described the trip as a "visit" to her parents' home in Texas and
not a "separation" from her husband. She again left the marital abode approximately two
months before the assault but returned several weeks later after the parties had "talked to
each other." At that time, she told the husband she wanted "to make it work" but she did
not "love" him. Shortly after she returned, the husband moved out "to avoid . . . arguing
. . . in front of" their child. During this period, the husband filed a petition seeking custody
of the parties' child and they decided to consult a laywer "about getting a legal separation."
On the way to the lawyer's office, the wife stated that she did not want to separate "right
now." From the time the wife first left the marital abode approximately six months before
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As Kizer made clear, under the general rape statute a conviction
of one spouse for the rape of the other could be obtained only
when the wife clearly manifested an intent to terminate the marital relationship. To do this, the wife was required to live separate
and apart, to refrain from voluntary sexual intercourse, and in
light of all the circumstances, to otherwise conduct herself in a
manner that indicated that the marriage actually was over.74 Any
equivocal conduct on her part during the period preceding the putative sexual assault-conduct that could reasonably be interpreted as manifesting an intent to continue the marital relationship-would defeat a finding that she revoked implied consent to
marital intercourse.
In 1986, the General Assembly passed legislation dealing specifically with the problems of sexual assault within the marital relationship.7 5 Whether this legislation totally supersedes the
Weishaupt-Kizer mode of analysis is unclear. There is now a new
and discrete offense of marital rape. This offense is committed
when a person "has sexual intercourse with his or her spouse and
such act is accomplished against the spouse's will by force, threat
or intimidation of or against the spouse or another;" provided,
however, that no person may be found guilty of marital rape "unless, at the time of the alleged offense, (i) the spouses were living
separate and apart, or (ii) the defendant caused serious physical
injury to the spouse by the use of force or violence.

'76

No prosecu-

tion under this provision is possible, however, "unless the spouse
or someone on the spouse's behalf reports the violations

'77

within

ten days.
The new legislation departs from the Weishaupt-Kizer mode of
analysis in several major respects. First, the focus is no longer on
evidence of revocation of the implied consent to sexual intercourse
or on evidence of a de facto end to the marriage. Second, without
regard to factors other than the usual elements of rape, marital
rape may be established by showing that the defendant caused serious physical injury to the victim-spouse. 7 Finally, the statute
the assault until the date of the incident, the parties did not engage in sexual intercourse.
Id. at 258-60, 321 S.E.2d at 292-93.
74. Id. at 261-62, 321 S.E.2d at 294.
75. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61, -67.1, -67.2, -67.2:1, 19.2-218.1, -218.2 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
76. Id. § 18.2-61(B) (Cum. Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
77. Id. The ten day limitation does not apply when the spouse is physically unable to
make a report or is restrained or otherwise prevented from reporting the offense.
78. Id. § 18.2-61(B)(ii).
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distinguishes interspousal rape from other forms of rape by the
separate diversion, guilt-finding, and sentencing provisions 79 and
the requirement that no prosecution for marital rape may occur
unless the offense is reported within ten days.8 0
The General Assembly also created separate offenses of interspousal inanimate object sexual penetration,8 ' interspousal forcible
sodomy,8 2 and a wholly new offense of interspousal sexual assault.8 3
offenses
The elements and special procedural components of these
84
generally follow the statutory scheme for marital rape.
79. Marital rape, like other forms of rape, is punishable by a term of confinement from
five years to life. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(C) (Cum. Supp. 1986). The court is authorized to
suspend all or a portion of a sentence if the defendant completes a program of counseling or
therapy and, after the court considers "the views of the complaining witness," the court
finds that such action "will promote maintenance of the family unit and will be in the best
interests of the complaining witness." Id.
When a marital rape charge is filed upon a finding of probable cause at the preliminary
hearing, the court "may" request that its court services unit, in consultation with appropriate mental health organizations, prepare a report analyzing the feasibility of providing counseling or therapy. Based upon this report, the court "may, . . . with the consent of the
accused, the complaining witness and the attorney for the Commonwealth" authorize the
accused to participate in a course of counseling or therapy. Id. § 19.2-218.1 (Cum. Supp.
1986). Upon successful completion of the program, the court "may," after considering the
"views of the complaining witness, discharge the proceedings" if the court finds such action
will "promote maintenance of the family unit and be in the best interest of the complaining
witness." Id. If no preliminary hearing is held prior to indictment, the circuit court must
refer the case to the juvenile and domestic relations district court for consideration of counseling and therapy. Id. § 19.2-218.2 (Cum. Supp. 1986). If the counseling and therapy program is ordered and completed, the circuit court "may" dismiss the charges with the consent of the Commonwealth's attorney and "if the court finds such action will promote
maintenance of the family unit and be in the best interest of the complaining witness." Id.
Finally, in any case tried by the court, the court, without entering a judgment of guilty
and with the consent of the complaining witness and the Commonwealth's attorney, may
defer further proceedings and place the defendant on probation pending completion of
counseling, if not already provided. The court may also dismiss the proceedings "after consideration of the views of the complaining witness" and if "the court finds such action will
promote maintenance of the family unit and be in the best interests of the complaining
witness." Id. § 18.2-61(D) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
80. Id. § 18.2-61(B).
81. Id. § 18.2-67.2(B).
82. Id. § 18.2-67.1(B).
83. Id. § 18.2-67.2:1.
84. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-67.1, -67.2, -67.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 1986). The only truly new offense is the crime of marital sexual assault. This offense, punishable by confinement for up
to twenty years, apparently attempts to bridge the gap between the general rape, sodomy,
and inanimate object sexual penetration offenses and their interspousal counterparts. This
offense is committed when one spouse "engages in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio,
analingus or anal intercourse" or inanimate object sexual penetration with his or her spouse
and "such act is accomplished against the spouse's will by force or a present threat of force
against the spouse or another person." Id. § 18.2-67.2:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1985). There is no
requirement that the parties were living separate and apart at the time, and no requirement
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IV.

779

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

For the third time in the past four years, the General Assembly
has significantly modified the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. In 1984, the legislature first enacted the so-called
"per se" offense-the offense of driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more by weight by volume.8 5 With the

addition of the "per se" method of proof, the commonwealth could
prove the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol in either
of two ways: by establishing that the defendant drove with a
blood-alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more by weight by
volume as shown by a chemical test (breath or blood) administered
in accordance with Virginia's implied consent law, or by proving
that the defendant drove "while

. .

.under the influence of alco-

hol." 86 The latter method of proof is aided by a statutory presumption that the accused was under the influence of alcohol at the
time, if the blood-alcohol level was 0.10 percent or more.8 7 The
government may, however, prove guilt by other evidence that the
accused was "intoxicated" at the time of the offense.8 8 In 1986, the
General Assembly amended the so-called "per se" method of proof
to make it unlawful to drive a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol
concentration of 0.10 percent or more by weight by volume as
shown by a lawfully administered chemical test.89
While there are no reported cases on point, there is uncertainty
regarding the proper method of charging and proving the offense
of driving under the influence of alcohol. There is only one offense
of driving under the influence of alcohol, but the offense may be
that the defendant caused serious physical injury to the victim. It also is significant that
marital sexual assault, unlike the other interspousal sexual offenses, is committed only when
against the will of the victim "by force or a present threat of force against the spouse or

another person." The other new interspousal sexual offenses require proof of "force, threat
or intimidation of or against the spouse or another person." The marital sexual assault stat-

ute does, however, require reporting of the offense within ten days. The offense of marital
sexual assault is specifically designated as a necessarily included offense of marital rape,

sodomy, and inanimate object sexual penetration. Id. § 18.2-67.2:1(E) (Cum.Supp. 1986).
85. 1984 VA. AcTs 666.
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
87. Id. § 18.2-269.
88. See Overbee v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 238, 315 S.E.2d 242 (1984); Clemmer v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 661, 159 S.E.2d 664 (1968); Coffey v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 185, 116

S.E.2d 257 (1960).
The language "under the influence of alcohol" means "intoxicated" as defined in VA. CODE
ANN. § 4-2(14) (Cum. Supp. 1986). See Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 954, 81

S.E.2d 614, 619 (1965).
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Cur. Supp. 1986).
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proved in two different ways: through proof consisting solely of the
level of blood-alcohol as shown by chemical analysis (the "per se"
method of proof), or through proof of intoxication by evidence of
the defendant's condition at the time of the offense, aided by proof
of the level of blood-alcohol as shown by chemical test and the
statutory presumptions arising therefrom (the "intoxication"
method of proof).90 Some trial courts apparently require the commonwealth at the outset of trial to elect which method of proof it
intends to rely upon; other courts, however, do not require election
until after the evidence is presented.
The timing of the election may be important. While the admissibility of the chemical analysis of the defendant's blood-alcohol
level is important even when the commonwealth is attempting to
use the "intoxication" method of proof, it is essential to the proof
of the "per se" branch of the offense. At the outset of trial, the
admissibility of the chemical analysis will be uncertain. If the commonwealth is required to elect, and elects the "per se" method of
proof, but is unable to secure the admission of the results of the
chemical analysis, the case is lost. However, with the "intoxication" method of proof, the commonwealth may still prove intoxication by other means.
Two recent cases illustrate the problems that can arise, but also
demonstrate that it is possible to secure a conviction under the
"intoxication" branch of the offense without the admission of a
chemical analysis.
In Overbee v. Commonwealth,"' a case tried before the adoption
of the "per se" method of proof, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled
that the certificate of analysis of the results of a breath sample
administered pursuant to the "implied consent" law was inadmissible because the commonwealth did not prove that the sample was
obtained pursuant to an arrest which occurred within two hours of
the alleged operation of the motor vehicle, as required by law. 2
90. See supra note 88.
91. 227 Va. 238, 315 S.E.2d 242 (1984).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268(b) (Cum. Supp. 1986) provides that any person who operates a motor vehicle on a public highway is deemed thereby to have consented to having a
sample of his or her breath or blood taken and analyzed to determine alcoholic content. The
"implied consent," however, is effective only if the driver is arrested for driving under the
influence within two hours of the alleged offense. Id.; Thomas v. Town of Marion, 226 Va.
251, 253, 308 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1983).
In Overbee, the defendant was not in the automobile when the arresting officer first observed him. Instead, he was standing in front of the vehicle. The hood was up, the engine
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Without the certificate of analysis, the commonwealth was unable
to obtain the benefit of the presumption of intoxication and was
therefore required to prove intoxication based upon other evidence
of the defendant's condition at the time of the offense.9 3
In Essex v. Commonwealth,94 another case tried before the
adoption of the "per se" method of proof, the defendant, convicted
of second-degree murder and driving under the influence of alcohol, refused to submit to a breath or blood-alcohol test as required
by the "implied consent" law.95 Nevertheless, at the hospital where
the defendant was taken following the accident, a blood-alcohol
test was performed approximately two and one-half hours after the
accident. The results of the test were admitted into evidence, but
not under the provision of the Code which provides that the results of tests performed under the implied consent law are selfauthenticating. Instead, the commonwealth established a proper
foundation for the admission of the test results, presumably by evidence that would support the introduction of the results of any
scientific test.96 The supreme court upheld the use of the test results but, because the blood test was not administered in accordance with the "implied consent law," the commonwealth was unable to gain the benefit of the presumption of intoxication. Essex
is significant because the court specifically held that the results of
scientific tests otherwise admissible may be used to prove
intoxication.
In both Overbee and Essex, the commonwealth was unable to
was not running and the ignition key had been removed. 227 Va. at 240, 315 S.E.2d at 243.
The result of the breath test administered, therefore, was inadmissible because there was no
evidence to show the time of the defendant's operation of the vehicle. Id. at 243, 315 S.E.2d
at 244.
93. Id. at 244-45, 315 S.E.2d at 245. The case was remanded for a new trial without the
evidence of the results of the breath test. Other evidence of the defendant's intoxication was
presented at the trial and for this reason, the court held that the evidence exclusive of the
breath test was not insufficient as a matter of law to prove intoxication. Id.
94. 228 Va. 273, 322 S.E.2d 216 (1984). For a discussion of the second-degree murder
aspects of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 57-63.
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268 (Cum. Supp. 1986). The penalty for an "unreasonable" refusal to submit to the test is suspension of the defendant's driver's license for six months or
one year in the event of a second or subsequent offense within one year. Id. § 18.2-268(n).
96. Id. § 18.2-268(e) provides that a certificate of analysis attesting to the results of the
blood or breath test administered in compliance with the requirements of the statute is
admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein and of the results of the analysis.
The Code also specifically provides, however, that nothing in the implied consent law
limits the introduction of other relevant evidence of intoxication. Id. § 18.2-268(i).
97. Essex, 228 Va. at 286, 322 S.E.2d at 223.
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utilize the results of a chemical test authorized by the "implied
consent" law. Had such cases been brought under the "per se"
branch of the offense, conviction would have been impossible.
However, in both instances, proof of intoxication by other means
was still feasible.
The General Assembly has also altered the procedure relating to
the taking of a breath or blood sample under the "implied consent" law. Upon arrest, the accused may elect to have either (but
not both) a blood or breath test taken, provided, however, that it is
no defense to the prosecution if one of the two tests is unavailable.9" This provision was inserted in 1985 and repealed an earlier
version of the statute. The earlier statute allowed the arresting officer to elect which test would be administered and, in the event
the arresting officer elected to administer the breath test, required
that the officer inform the accused, in writing, of his right to have a
blood test taken at his own expense.99 Under the current law, if the
accused elects a breath test, he is entitled upon request to observe
the process of analysis and to see the blood-alcohol reading. 10 0
V.

A.

MISCELLANEOUS CRIMES AND DEFENSES

Duress

As Justice Rehnquist recently observed, "[c]riminal liability is
normally based upon the concurrence of two factors, 'an evil-meaning mind [and] an evil-doing hand.' ,,"o Occasionally, courts must
decide whether criminal liability should be imposed when coercive
conditions or necessity are present, even though an evil-doing hand
and an evil-meaning mind are also present. 02
Historically, the law has recognized the defenses of duress and
necessity. Duress will excuse criminal conduct where the actor
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268(b) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
99. The provision authorizing the arresting officer to make the election was added in
1984. 1984 VA.AcTs 1155-59. This provision was repealed the following year. 1985 VA. ACTs
1135-39 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268(b) (Cure. Supp. 1986)).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268(b) (Cum. Supp. 1986). If the equipment automatically produces a written printout, the accused must be given the printout or a copy thereof. Id.
101. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980) (quoting Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952)).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting a defense
of duress to a charge of selling drugs where the defendant's friends were threatened with
death if he did not sell the drugs); State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, 410 A.2d 1000 (1979)
(rejecting the defense of "necessity" to a charge of unlawful trespass arising out of demonstrations at a nuclear power plant site).
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"was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily
injury" which caused the actor to commit the criminal acts. 10 3 The
defense of necessity will excuse criminal conduct where "physical
forces beyond the actor's control rendered [the] illegal conduct the
lesser of two evils."'1 4 The distinction between the two defenses
has been blurred in modern usages.1 05
The Court of Appeals of Virginia recently held that the evidence
in support of the defense of duress was insufficient to negate criminal liability for unlawfully obtaining drugs by fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentations. In Pancoast v. Commonwealth, °6 an intern at
the Medical College of Virginia knowingly filled out and signed
false prescriptions to enable her husband, an addict, to obtain controlled drugs. She claimed that she lacked the required felonious
intent to commit the crimes because of the pressure from her husband to write the prescriptions. She alleged that her husband had
threatened her with death, and that she did not leave him because
she had no place to go and
was afraid that he might do something
07
violent to someone else..

Two specific false prescriptions formed the basis for the charges.
With respect to the first, the defendant testified that it was written
after she arrived home feeling tired, having had no sleep for two
days. She found her husband "frantic" because he had no drugs.
She initially refused his request, but relented when he persisted. 08
On the second occasion, she testified that her husband insisted
that she accompany him to the pharmacy "so that things look
real." 09 She refused and he hit her. When they arrived at the
pharmacy, she filled out the prescription while her husband walked
up and down the aisles thirty feet from her. She testified that, because she was afraid of her husband, she did not tell the pharmacist about the false prescription. 110 A clinical psychologist de103. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409.
104. Id. at 410.
105. The Model Penal Code retains the defense of duress, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09
(1962), but also incorporates a more general statement on "justification." Id. § 3.02. The
"justification" provision of the Model Penal Code establishes an affirmative defense whenever the actor engages in "[c]onduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm
or evil to himself or to another," provided inter alia that "the harm or evil sought to be
avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented." Id.
106. 2 Va. App. 28, 340 S.E.2d 833 (1986).
107. Id. at 31, 340 S.E.2d at 835.
108. Id. at 30-31, 340 S.E.2d at 834-35.
109. Id. at 31, 340 S.E.2d at 835.
110. Id. at 31, 340 S.E.2d at 835.
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scribed the defendant as a "rescuer, a sitting duck for a master
manipulator like her husband."'1 1 He also testified that the defendant may have reasonably feared serious bodily harm from her
husband."'
The court of appeals rejected the claim of duress under these
circumstances. The court stated that the defense of duress required proof that the acts "were the product of threats inducing a
reasonable fear of immediate death or serious bodily injury," and
that even if such threats were present, "[i]f the defendant failed to
take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to escape, or of a reasonable opportunity to avoid doing the acts without being harmed,
he may not rely on duress as a defense.""13 In this case, the court
found no evidence of "threats of imminent death;" with respect to
the second incident, the court stated that "[h]ad she so desired,
she could have informed the pharmacist. . . that the prescription
have taken advantage "of an alternative
was fraudulent" and thus,
14
conduct.'
criminal
to
B. Legal Duty of Care
The scope and nature of the legal duty of care in the criminal
law is both complex and controversial. In Davis v. Commonwealth," 5 the Virginia Supreme Court found that, under the circumstances of the case, a daughter had a contractually based duty
of care for her mother and was guilty of criminal negligence in
causing her mother's death.
A criminal law sanction traditionally is imposed only for positive
acts; a failure to act is generally not culpable."16 Historically, however, a failure to act (sometimes called a "negative act") may serve
as the basis for a criminal sanction when there is a legal duty to
undertake positive action. "[A] person failing to act when he has a
duty to do so may be held to be criminally liable just as one who
has acted improperly.""17 The legal duty of care may arise from a
111. Id. at 31-32, 340 S.E.2d at 835.
112. Id. The psychologist also described the husband as a "moderately severe passive personality ... who is extremely adept at manipulating." Id.
113. Id. at 33, 340 S.E.2d at 836 (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 407-09
(1980)).
114. Id. at 33-34, 340 S.E.2d at 836.
115. 230 Va. 201, 335 S.E.2d 375 (1985).

116. R. PERKINS & R. BoycE,
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650 (3d ed. 1982).

117. Id. (quoting United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1978)).
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variety of sources. It may be imposed by statute, by common law
tradition, or by contract. A mere "moral" obligation to act will not
suffice.1 18
In Davis, the evidence established that the defendant accepted
sole responsibility for her mother's care. It was her full-time occupation. In return for care, the defendant's mother allowed her to
live in her home expense-free. The defendant shared her mother's
social security income and acted as her food stamp representative.
The defendant informed a number of people that she was responsible for the "total care" bf her mother. Consequently, the court
found that these facts were sufficient to give rise to an "implied
contract" of care. 129
Once the duty of care was established, the court had to decide
whether the defendant was criminally negligent in failing to pro120
vide her mother with "heat, food, liquids, and other necessaries.'
Expert medical testimony established that the defendant's mother
died from "pneumonia and freezing to death due to exposure to
cold with a chronic state of starvation."- 2 ' When a paramedic arrived at the residence, he found the decedent lying on a bed. There
was no source of heat in the decedent's room. Only small amounts
of food were found in the house. When the decedent was admitted
to the hospital, her body temperature was eighty degrees. Doctors
diagnosed her principal problems as low body temperature, severe
malnutrition and bilateral pneumonia. She also was found to have
a blood stream infection, a skull laceration, and multiple rib fractures. She died two days after admission to the hospital. Expert
medical testimony also established that, at the time the decedent
was admitted to the hospital, she had not received liquids for at
least two days and had eaten "no food whatsoever" for at least
thirty days. 1 22 Finally, a physician testified that the defendant had
stated that her mother was senile and totally disabled, was not
able to feed herself, was not able to care for her personal needs,
and had to wear diapers. 23 Based upon these facts, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
118. See Davis, 230 Va. at 205, 335 S.E.2d at 378.
119. Id. at 203-05, 335 S.E.2d at 377-78.
120. Id. at 202, 335 S.E.2d at 376. The court noted that, when death results from a "malicious" omission to perform a legal duty, the offense is murder; when the omission is "criminally negligent," the offense is manslaughter. Id. at 205, 335 S.E.2d at 378.
121. Id. at 203, 335 S.E.2d at 376.
122. Id. at 202-03, 335 S.E.2d at 376-77.
123. Id. at 203, 335 S.E.2d at 377.
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court's verdict of involuntary manslaughter; that is, the evidence
was sufficient to establish that defendant's conduct was so gross
and wanton as to show a callous and reckless disregard for her
mother's life, and that her failure to provide her mother with heat,
food, liquids, and other necessaries was the proximate cause of her

death. 124
C. Diminished Capacity
In Stamper v. Commonwealth, 2 5 the supreme court once again
rejected an attempt to use the defense of "diminished capacity"
for the purpose of establishing that the defendant was incapable of
entertaining the requisite specific intent to commit the offense.
The court stated that "[flor the purposes of determining criminal
responsibility a perpetrator is either legally insane or sane; there is
no sliding scale.' 12 The court also stated that "evidence of a defendant's mental state at the time of the offense is, in the absence
127
of an insanity defense, irrelevant to the issue of guilt.'
D.

Accommodation Defense

In Heacock v. Commonwealth,12s the supreme court imposed a
significant limitation on the so-called "accommodation" defense to
124. Id. at 206-07, 335 S.E.2d at 379.
125. 228 Va. 707, 324 S.E.2d 682 (1985). In Stamper, the defendant was convicted of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. He sought to introduce expert medical
testimony to prove that he was a "manic depressive" and consequently "incapable of forming the intent to distribute" which is a requisite element of the offense. The trial court
refused to allow the testimony because the defendant did not put forth an "insanity defense." Id. at 715-16, 324 S.E.2d at 687.
The so-called "diminished capacity" or "diminished responsibility" defense normally is
used to refer to evidence that purports to negate the existence of the mental state required
to prove the offense charged; that is, the defense attempts to prove that because of his
mental state the defendant was incapable of entertaining a specific intent to commit the
crime. The diminished capacity defense is recognized in some jurisdictions, especially when
used to reduce the degree of homicide from murder to manslaughter. See, e.g., People v.
Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
126. Stamper, 228 Va. at 717, 324 S.E.2d at 688.
127. Id. Arguably, Stamper is analytically inconsistent with the line of Virginia decisions
which hold that a defendant's voluntary state of intoxication may be used to negate the
element of premeditation so as to avoid a first-degree murder conviction. See Hatcher v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 811, 814, 241 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978). It is difficult to distinguish
between voluntary intoxication, when used to negate evidence of a mens rea aspect of an
offense, and a mental disorder when used for the same purpose.
128. 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984). For a discussion of the homicide aspects of the
case, see supra text accompanying notes 42-54.
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a charge of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute. In an earlier decision, the court noted that the accommodation defense was designed to apply when the distribution was
made "not by a dealer in drugs, a pusher or one who was normally
engaged in the drug traffic, but by an individual citizen who was
motivated by a desire to accommodate a friend.' 1 29 In Heacock,
the evidence established that the defendant was the supplier of
"high quality" cocaine for a "drug party." The drugs were provided free of charge. Other evidence suggested, however, that the
defendant was a "dealer in drugs.' 130 The court held that the defendant, as a dealer in drugs, could not assert the accommodation
defense under the circumstances even though he distributed the
drugs without charge. The court stated that a dealer "must cultivate and maintain a familiar clientele" and that a "drug party, catered gratis by a dealer, is a typical public-relations tool designed
to promote good will, strengthen mutual confidence and interdependence, and enhance the dealer's business prospects."'' Under
the statute, the defense is not available if the distribution was
made "with intent to profit thereby.' 13 2 "Profit" includes "any
consideration received or expected."' 33 The court concluded that
the defendant distributed the goods free of charge at the party
"with the expectation of promoting profits from future sales.' 34
Heacock is significant not just because the accommodation defense
129. Stillwell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 214, 219, 247 S.E.2d 360, 364 (1978). The socalled "accommodation" defense to a charge of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II substance is set forth in VA- CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(a) (Cum. Supp. 1986). The
defense, if established, reduces the penalty for a first offense from five to forty years in
prison to a class five felony, the maximum penalty for which is ten years imprisonment. VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
130. The evidence used to support the finding that the defendant was a "dealer in drugs"
included evidence that the drug supplied was "high quality cocaine," evidence of the large
amount supplied for the party, evidence of his possession of drug paraphernalia, and evidence that, the day following the death of one of the participants at the party, he delivered
additional cocaine to a third party. Heacock, 228 Va. at 406, 323 S.E.2d at 95.
131. Id. at 406-07, 323 S.E.2d at 96.
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(a) (Cum. Supp. 1986). In King v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.
171, 247 S.E.2d 368 (1978), the court stated that the term "profit" means "a commercial
transaction in which there is a consideration involved. It does not necessarily mean that a
seller of drugs has to sell his drugs to a buyer at a price in excess of the amount the seller
paid for the drugs." King, 219 Va. at 174, 247 S.E.2d at 370.
The statute also provides that the accommodation defense is unavailable if the act is done
with the intent "to induce the recipient or intended recipient. . . to use or become addicted
to or dependent upon such controlled substance." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(a) (Cum. Supp.
1986).
133. Heacock, 228 Va. at 407, 323 S.E.2d at 96.
134. Id.
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was denied even though the evidence established that the defendant provided drugs to others free of charge; Heacock suggests that
any time a defendant seeks to raise the defense, the commonwealth may respond with evidence of "other crimes" which would
prove that the defendant was a drug dealer, thereby negating the
accommodation defense. 3 5 A defendant with a prior criminal record of drug distribution charges, therefore, must weigh the benefit
to be gained by the accommodation defense, even if successful,
against the damage done to his case by the introduction of the
"other crimes" evidence.

135. Traditionally, evidence of other criminal acts by the defendant is inadmissible to
prove guilt of the offense charged. Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176
S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970). Such evidence is admissible, however, when relevant to an issue or
element in the case. Id.

